Machine Learning and Human Perspective by Underwood, Ted
 C
ONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE MEASUREMENT OF LITERATURE ARE 
much older than the phrase digital humanities. Many of the 
questions now pursued with computers can be traced back to 
researchers who worked “with pen and graph paper” in the mid-
dle of the twentieth century (Buurma and Heffernan). Objections 
to quantitative methods can be traced back even further. For more 
than a century, critics have observed that numbers stabilize neutral 
facts about the past at the cost of flattening out the perspectival vari-
ety that gives history meaning. In 1910, the perspectival character of 
human experience was Wilhelm Dilthey’s reason for separating the 
human sciences from the natural sciences (154–64). In 1973, Stanley 
Fish objected to the quantitative study of literary style for a similar 
reason. Computers may tell us that Jonathan Swift used a lot of con-
nective words. But the literary meaning of Swift’s style, Fish argued, 
could vary from one interpretive community to another.
These objections never stopped literary scholars from using num-
bers in certain special contexts, such as book history. But exceptions 
of that kind only seemed to prove the rule that intellectual life was 
broadly divided between “interpretive” disciplines and “quantitative” 
ones (Smith). Contemporary debates about digital humanities may ap-
pear to retrace the same divide. Franco Moretti presents distant read-
ing as a project that replaces “interpretation” with “the explanation of 
general structures” (91). Critics have responded that quantitative anal-
ysis will always miss the point of literature, which is to foreground 
the “infinite variation” of “human perception” (Drucker, “Why” 634). 
Both sides seem to be restating the twentieth- century consensus that 
numbers are useful for measuring objective facts but not for inter-
preting perspectival differences. Scholars who already know that their 
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own work is interpretive may understandably 
feel that they can skip the whole debate.
For most of the twentieth century, that 
was a safe policy. But the boundary between 
quantitative and interpretive methods was 
always permeable, and recent intellectual 
advances have made it easy to traverse. Since 
learning algorithms rely on examples rather 
than fixed definitions, they can be used to 
model the tacit assumptions shared by partic-
ular communities of production or reception. 
This approach gives quantitative research a 
new flexibility, which is allowing scholars to 
survey culture from specific vantage points 
in the past and even to measure the paral-
lax between vantage points. Literary histori-
ans have only recently begun to exploit these 
possibilities. But it is already clear that our 
inherited assumptions about the difference 
between measurement and interpretation 
need to be revised. In order to understand 
the shape of emerging theoretical debates, we 
will need to explore the perspectival uses of 
machine learning.
From Measurement to Modeling
Many things have changed since Fish wrote 
his critique of quantitative literary analysis 
in 1973. Computers are faster now; digital 
libraries are bigger. Since these changes of 
scale are easy to understand, digital human-
ists often use them to explain growing reli-
ance on numbers in the humanities. Critics 
are not wrong to feel that this explanation is 
incomplete. To be sure, numbers tend to be 
more useful at large scales of analysis. But 
scale has done nothing in itself to resolve the 
hermeneutic problem that troubled earlier 
forms of computational research. The con-
cepts that interest literary historians are still 
hard to measure, in part because their mean-
ings change from one context to another.
To understand why quantitative research 
has nevertheless made real progress in recent 
decades, we need to dig beyond hype (and 
alarm) about big data and notice subtle shifts 
of strategy. One of those shifts has been de-
scribed in recent PMLA articles that bracket 
debates about computers and the canon in or-
der to refocus theoretical conversation on the 
concept of a “model” (So; Piper). Instead of 
trying to measure a stable concept, humanists 
who build statistical models typically study a 
boundary between two social contexts. They 
try to understand this social boundary by 
measuring differences associated with it.1 The 
differences measured may not be important in 
themselves; they could involve things as trivial 
as punctuation marks. The goal of the inquiry 
is not to measure anything with inherent 
significance but rather to define a model—a 
relation between measurements—whose sig-
nificance will come from social context.
Consider the problem of representing 
gender. Whether we understand gender as a 
performance (Butler) or as a real “position 
one occupies” (Alcoff 148), it is clear that 
gender is relational. It is less a fact about the 
subject than about the subject’s relation to a 
social audience. So gender categories change 
their meaning as we move from one con-
text to another. Masculinity may not have 
meant the same thing in 1950 that it did in 
1850, and it may not mean the same thing for 
women that it does for men. Categories with 
this relational character are best represented 
indirectly. It would be fruitless to define or 
measure masculinity, since the category 
means very little in itself. But the transforma-
tions of masculinity—as we move from one 
period or perspective to another—are a topic 
that a model could illuminate.
A recent article I wrote with David Bam-
man and Sabrina Lee explores the transfor-
mations of gender by comparing the language 
used in characterization over a span of two 
centuries (Underwood et al., “Transforma-
tion”). A program called BookNLP clusters 
the names of the same character—so “Mag-
gie Tulliver” and “Maggie” can be treated as 
the same person in The Mill on the Floss—
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and then identifies words grammatically 
 associated with each person. This approach 
gives us only a fraction of the insight a hu-
man reader might extract. In the following 
passage, the only words the program links to 
Maggie are the ones I have italicized:
The resolute din, the unresting motion of 
the great stones, giving her a dim delicious 
awe as at the presence of an uncontrollable 
force—the meal forever pouring, pouring—
the fine white powder softening all surfaces, 
and making the very spider- nets look like a 
faery lace- work—the sweet pure scent of the 
meal—all helped to make Maggie feel that the 
mill was a little world apart from her outside 
every- day life. The spiders were especially a 
subject of speculation with her. She wondered 
if they had any relatives. . . . (Eliot 1: 45–46)
Arguably, George Eliot is using the flowing, 
tumbling energy of the mill, hidden from the 
outside world, to characterize Maggie met-
onymically. BookNLP misses that metonymy 
and knows only that Maggie is someone 
who has “awe” and a “life” and who “feels” 
and “wonders.” But that isn’t a terrible sum-
mary of the broad strokes this passage uses 
to characterize her. Even if we are capturing 
only broad strokes, interesting patterns be-
come legible when we swing BookNLP across 
87,800 books and millions of characters in 
En glish- language fiction (Underwood et al., 
“Replication Data”).
For instance, we can ask how the signs 
of gender used in characterization vary with 
authors’ identities. One could eventually 
pose that question about many different au-
thorial roles—including collective authors 
and pseudonyms, as well as cis and trans 
identities. But we might start by considering 
perspectives on gender expressed by writers 
who publicly identified as either “men” or 
“women.” (Public identification is not ex-
pressed only on title pages; for example, El-
iot eventually stepped forward as a woman, 
and she is recorded as one here.) Both axes in 
 figure 1 measure the tendency for a word to 
be associated grammatically with feminine or 
masculine characters. Each axis is, in short, a 
model of a particular perspective on gender. 
The only difference between the axes is that 
the vertical axis measures gender differentia-
tion in books by women and the horizontal 
axis measures it in books by men. We can 
think of the image as a model of the relation 
between two perspectives.
The northeast and southwest corners of 
figure 1 contain words whose gendered con-
notations are a subject of broad agreement. No 
matter who wrote the book, feminine charac-
ters tend to have mothers and hair and say 
“oh.” Masculine characters tend to have beards 
and pockets and say “sir.” Things get more in-
teresting when we look along the other diago-
nal.2 In the northwest corner, we find words 
that men tend to apply to men and that women 
tend to apply to women. It turns out that when 
Maggie “wondered” about spiders, she was do-
ing something authors associate with charac-
ters of their own gender. The same thing holds 
true for remembering, thinking, hearing, and 
seeing. These verbs are clearly signs of sub-
jectivity. It is less obvious why authors claim 
certain body parts (the feet, throat, head, and 
stomach) for their own gender identity.
In the southeast corner, we find a group 
of words that men use in describing women 
and that women use in describing men. Heter-
onormative patterns are visible here; most au-
thors talk more about marrying, kissing, and 
loving when a character doesn’t share their 
gender identity. Passive roles are also promi-
nent. I have used the prefix “was-” to indicate 
cases where a character is the object of a verb 
rather than its subject. So the sentence “In the 
darkness of that night she saw Stephen’s face 
turned towards her in passionate, reproach-
ful misery” counts as an instance of “saw” for 
Maggie but as an instance of “was- seen” for 
Stephen Guest (Eliot 3: 231; emphasis added). 
Other words in this region describe how a 
character was seen, even when the character 
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is the subject of the sentence: they describe a 
character’s “expression” or “tone,” or how the 
character “seemed” to another observer. It is 
clear, in short, that women writers tend to de-
scribe men externally—and vice versa.
This pattern is not shocking. But that 
is not to say we knew it all in advance. And 
some details remain unclear. I still don’t 
know why writers claim the stomach and feet 
for their own gender. More importantly, it 
would have been plausible to expect subjectiv-
ity and passivity to be gendered primarily in 
books by men—while books by women might 
distribute seeing and being seen equally 
among their masculine and feminine charac-
ters. In many other cases, the distorting ef-
fects of gender are concentrated among men. 
For instance, men create lopsided ensembles 
of characters, rarely more than a third of 
them women, while women tend to balance 
their dramatis personae evenly (Underwood 
et al., “Transformation”). But the perspectival 
distortions traced in figure 1 are largely sym-
metrical, with blind spots on both sides. Now 
that we have traced this  symmetry, it may 
appear, in hindsight, inevitable. But it isn’t 
something we actually knew, or something 
we fully understand even now.
FIG. 1
The gendering of words used in characterization. The data set is composed of 87,800 works of En glish- language fiction pub-
lished between 1780 and 2007. On each axis, positive numbers indicate that a word is overrepresented in descriptions of women 
and negative numbers indicate that it is overrepresented in descriptions of men. The scale is the signed log of the log- likelihood 
ratio (Dunning). Areas with many overlapping dots look darker.
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I have offered figure 1 as an example of 
the indirection of contemporary quantitative 
methods. Instead of trying to define gender, 
this diagram models a contrast between two 
perspectives on the topic. I recognize that 
gender theorists will be frustrated by the bi-
nary structure of the  diagram. To be sure, 
this binary has folded back on itself, in order 
to acknowledge that social systems look dif-
ferent from different positions in the system. 
But the diagram does still reduce the complex 
reality of gender identification to two public 
roles: men and women. I needed a simple 
picture, frankly, in order to explain how a 
quantitative model can be said to represent a 
perspective. But nothing about this method 
compels us to stop at two perspectives. We 
can also multiply gender identities, pose 
intersectional questions, or inquire about 
historical transformations of gender, as my 
coauthors and I recently attempted (Under-
wood et al., “Transformation”).
Miriam Posner has rightly character-
ized the fluidity of digital ontologies as “the 
radical, unrealized potential of digital hu-
manities.” Making that potential into real-
ity will require many strategies; the rest of 
this essay explores a particularly f lexible 
one. Instead of turning two roles into four, 
or ten, we could jettison the whole premise 
that researchers must decide in advance on 
a fixed set of categories. Because figure 1 is 
plotting numbers loosely analogous to pro-
portions (the representation of A relative to 
B), it compelled us to sort characters into 
mutually exclusive groups. And when groups 
are understood as exclusive, a researcher 
does need to draw up a list of categories in 
advance. But there are more flexible ways to 
build and compare models. The predictive 
models produced by machine learning don’t 
require a world of exclusive categories with 
consistent definitions. All they require is an 
observer who can point at examples of some-
thing they have in mind. There is no limit to 
the number of observers.
Multiplying Perspectives
To explain how such a loose- jointed approach 
could work, the rest of this essay explores the 
history of genre—a topic that benefits enor-
mously from flexibility. Critics once imag-
ined genres as a limited set of natural literary 
kinds, each organized by a unifying rationale, 
like the concept of “the novum” that Darko 
Suvin thought unified works of science fiction 
(79). But late- twentieth- century historicism 
undermined that confidence (Warhol). Since 
the 1980s, scholars have tended to envision 
genres as “empirical, not logical” categories—
“groupings [that] arise at particular historical 
moments,” that “need not have a single trait 
in common,” and that “are subject to repeated 
redefinitions or abandonment” as social con-
ditions change (Cohen 210).
This theory of genre is appealing because 
it seems to promise a more f lexible literary 
history, rooted in the imperfect continuities of 
human life rather than in imaginary univer-
sals. But the theory doesn’t provide a way to 
measure degrees of similarity between group-
ings created at different moments. So liter-
ary historians still often fall back on lumping 
and splitting strategies of an all- or- nothing 
kind. For instance, contemporary fans may 
see works by the nineteenth- century writers 
Mary Shelley and Jules Verne as examples 
of science fiction. But the phrase science fic-
tion first appeared in the 1920s. Nineteenth- 
century readers didn’t necessarily assume that 
Shelley’s dark stories belonged with Verne’s 
voyages extraordinaires (“extraordinary jour-
neys”) or with dream visions of a utopian fu-
ture. Toward the end of the century, a concept 
of so- called scientific romance did begin to 
take shape around Verne and H. G. Wells. But 
some scholars distinguish scientific romance 
from science fiction and argue that the lat-
ter crystallized only in the second quarter of 
the twentieth century (Stableford; Westfahl). 
Others argue that neither concept is stable. 
According to one recent history, “there is no 
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such thing as SF—but instead multiple and 
constantly shifting ways of producing, mar-
keting, distributing, consuming and under-
standing texts as SF” (Bould and Vint 1).
Frustration with the semantic character 
of these debates probably unites everyone who 
has participated in them. At this point, schol-
ars know that genres don’t really have crisp 
boundaries. We know that our task is not to 
define terms (or utterly reject them) but to 
trace the gradual mutations of social practice. 
Unfortunately, in tracing those changes it is 
hard to rule out the possibility that the con-
tinuities we perceive have been created by the 
very genealogical assumptions we set out to 
test. Stepping outside our own assumptions is 
always difficult, and especially difficult for his-
torians because time only flows in one direc-
tion. To correct retrospective bias, a cautious 
researcher might like to send a box of twenty- 
first- century books back to readers in 1895 
along with a letter asking them to pick out 
anything that looks like a scientific romance. 
Alas, a box of that kind is hard to send.
But perhaps we could use the documents 
dead people have left behind to reconstruct 
their practices of selection? Computer sci-
ence may help. The point of machine learning 
is exactly to model practices of categorization 
that lack a definition and can be inferred only 
from examples. We may not know how to de-
fine spam, although we recognize it in our in- 
box. So a spam filter begins with a training 
set composed of messages that readers did or 
did not mark as spam. An algorithm learns to 
model spam using whichever textual details 
do in practice distinguish those groups of 
messages. It is a flexible strategy that excels at 
reproducing human behavior, but also a risky 
strategy when neutrality is the goal. A bank 
shouldn’t use machine learning to winnow 
loan applications unless it plans to accept all 
the assumptions made by the people who ap-
proved or rejected loans in the training set. 
Even if overt signs of race and gender are re-
moved from the data, an algorithm trying to 
reproduce human choices may well find prox-
ies for race and gender buried in addresses 
and occupations.
But capturing the unfair, ill- defined as-
sumptions implicit in a particular set of hu-
man choices is exactly what historians need 
to do. Literary historians know that the prac-
tices they want to reconstruct were not neu-
tral or objective. For example, we know that 
the gender of the author may play a role when 
readers are categorizing a book as science fic-
tion or fantasy. Our goal in modeling genre 
is not to rewrite history as if it had been fair 
but to represent real practices of selection so 
that we can trace degrees of similarity among 
the perspectives of different places and times. 
Strange as it may seem, machine learning is 
precisely suited to this purpose.
How does it work? The algorithms used in 
this article are supervised, which means that 
they learn from texts that have been labeled 
by human readers. Each perspective on genre 
is represented as a fuzzy boundary separating 
texts that were, or were not, assigned a partic-
ular genre label. If texts were points in three- 
dimensional space, this boundary would be 
a plane tilted at an angle that separated most 
of the works labeled fantasy from most of the 
ones with other labels. I say “most” because 
all statistical models are imperfect. We will 
be interested in the errors they make. But be-
fore inquiring about error, we need to ask how 
texts can be represented as points in space at 
all. What variables would count as height or 
width? Researchers could try to define vari-
ables cleverly suited to a particular genre. For 
instance, to identify fantasy, we might ask, 
How much does this plot depend on magic? 
But that would entail risky assumptions, since 
we don’t really know that magic is essential to 
fantasy or how to distinguish magic from “suf-
ficiently advanced technology” (Clarke 21n1).
Remember, however, that a model of loan 
applications didn’t need explicit references 
to gender or race in order to absorb human 
bias. Similarly, although we may not know 
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which attributes define fantasy for a given 
reader, we can expect many of those attributes 
to leave traces somewhere in the text. So a 
model might simply count words, treating the 
relative frequency of each word as a dimen-
sion like height or width. Since the vocabu-
lary of fiction contains thousands of words, 
this will produce a space with thousands of 
 dimensions, but a space of that kind can still 
be divided by a hyperplane.3
A skeptic might protest that genres are 
defined not just by diction but by plot, setting, 
and theme—which is true. But this article is 
not aiming to define genres. Rather, it uses 
models to represent genres as practices of re-
ception so that we can compare the practices 
of different eras. Models represent reception 
in an active and concrete sense, by re- creating 
the selection practices of a particular reader or 
group of readers. A model trained on a subset 
of texts labeled by a reader should be able to 
recognize not only the texts it was trained on, 
but other texts that the same reader assigned 
to the same genre. (In fact, to avoid circularity, 
models are always tested on these more chal-
lenging held- out examples, not the examples 
in their training set.) And while diction might 
not provide a very satisfying abstract defini-
tion of a genre, it is more than sufficient to 
support this kind of concrete re- creation. For 
example, statistical models based simply on 
words and punctuation can distinguish mys-
teries from works in other genres with 93% ac-
curacy. If we peer into the internal workings 
of these models, we will find that they rely 
heavily on question marks and words express-
ing uncertainty, like whoever. While these de-
tails are technically matters of diction, they 
are also clearly shaped by the larger interroga-
tive structure of a mystery plot. It turns out 
that many formal patterns leave verbal traces 
of this kind. So researchers have found that 
they don’t need to represent plot and character 
directly in order to predict human judgments 
shaped by plot and character (Allison et al.; 
Underwood, Distant Horizons 34–67).
To illustrate the f luidity that quantita-
tive models can add to our histories of genre, 
the rest of this article will compare a range of 
perspectives on science fiction and fantasy.4 
These genres are usefully puzzling. Their 
histories have been written in many differ-
ent ways and are sometimes even collapsed 
into a single story about speculative fiction. A 
book- length study of this history might draw 
evidence from dozens of bibliographies or 
thousands of book reviews, and might explore 
differences between national traditions. This 
article sets out more modestly to illustrate 
the potential of a new approach and uses a 
more restricted kind of evidence. I will focus 
on works originally written in En glish (plus a 
few influential works in translation) and will 
compare only a handful of perspectives.
The most important source is the library 
itself. Genre classifications drawn from Ha-
thiTrust and OCLC allowed me to find thou-
sands of volumes that librarians had labeled 
“fantasy fiction” and “science fiction.”5 But li-
brarians’ genre labels were almost all assigned 
in the last forty years. When attached to books 
published before 1980, they might be project-
ing a recent perspective on literary practices 
that were understood differently at the time. So 
I have also sought out earlier sources—a dis-
sertation written in 1934, a circulating library 
catalog from 1911, and several early critical 
studies and bibliographies. Finally, I created 
a random background set composed of six 
hundred volumes of fiction from HathiTrust, 
excluding those marked as science fiction or 
fantasy. Combining all these sources gives us 
1,581 volumes, dated in most cases by first pub-
lication. A collection of 1,581 volumes doesn’t 
by any means exhaustively cover the history of 
genre. But the notion that quantitative inquiry 
aims at exhaustiveness has been oversold both 
by its recent advocates and by its critics. In 
truth, distant readers are always working with 
samples and are often more interested in mod-
eling the differences between samples than in 
making claims about the whole library.
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So what can perspectival models teach us 
about science fiction or fantasy? The words 
that end up predicting genres raise fascinat-
ing questions. Fantasy, for instance, can often 
be recognized by the words tale, sunlight, and 
seven. But I will mention individual words 
only brief ly here, because this essay is not 
trying to provide a single, stable definition of 
science fiction or fantasy. Instead it compares 
multiple models to explore perspectival ques-
tions about the history of genre. Researchers 
have found that the genres easiest for com-
puters to model are also the genres human 
readers tend to agree about (Calvo Tello). So 
comparing the strength of different mod-
els may cast new light on critical arguments 
about the relative stability of genres.
Let us start with models defined by the 
perspective of the librarians who assigned 
genre labels in the last forty years. It turns 
out that the volumes librarians call “science 
fiction”—sampled evenly from 1870 to 2010 
with a few examples from earlier in the nine-
teenth century—can be recognized by a single 
model with 89.9% accuracy. This is surpris-
ing, since critics don’t necessarily agree that 
works written before 1920 are really science 
fiction. Moreover, we tend to imagine that the 
distinguishing feature of this genre is tech-
nology, and technology changes quickly. Few 
of the inventions mentioned by Verne remain 
science- fictional today. But a linguistic model 
of this genre focuses less on submarines or 
rocket ships than on a general rhetoric of 
sublimity and ambiguity marked by large 
numbers, deliberately vague nouns like thing 
and creature, and verbs like blink and groped. 
Since this rhetoric unites authors ranging 
from Shelley to Kim Stanley Robinson, argu-
ments that “there is no such thing as science 
fiction” (Bould and Vint 1) would appear to 
have exaggerated the genre’s mutability.
With its anchor in the past, fantasy might 
seem more stable than science fiction: swords 
don’t date as quickly as ray guns. But when we 
group all the volumes contemporary librar-
ians call “fantasy,” they can be identified only 
84.5% of the time. The difference from the ac-
curacy of the model for science fiction (89.9%) 
may not sound huge, but the gap between the 
genres gets bigger as we go back in time (fig. 2). 
This widening gap suggests that the boundar-
ies of science fiction solidified earlier than the 
boundaries of the genre we now call fantasy. 
In fact, “fantasy” may not even be the right la-
bel to apply to works published before 1900; 
accuracy in that period falls low enough (77%) 
that one may wonder whether librarians who 
assigned the label “fantasy” were using an 
anachronistic concept.
The gap between science fiction and fan-
tasy isn’t the only interesting pattern in fig-
ure 2. The upward trend from 1875 to 1985 
implies that both genres became easier to 
separate from other fiction in the library—
although, in the case of science fiction, the 
change is only subtle. The increasing accuracy 
of these models is open to several explana-
tions. We could be seeing the consolidation 
of generic conventions associated with plot or 
theme: a more crisply delimited genre might 
become easier to identify. But since the genre 
labels used in figure 2 were assigned recently, 
it is also possible (at least in the case of fan-
tasy) that the labels are simply a better fit for 
late- twentieth- century literature than they 
are for literature from earlier periods.
The surprising part of figure 2 isn’t that 
genres become easier to recognize but that the 
change is so subtle in the case of science fic-
tion—which is often said not to have existed 
as a coherent genre before a crystallizing mo-
ment in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The creation of the magazine Amazing Stories 
in 1926 underwrites one popular origin story, 
because the magazine’s emergence coincided 
with the emergence of the term science fic-
tion itself (Westfahl 12). Gary K. Wolfe delays 
the moment of consolidation even longer, 
contending that “the science fiction novel 
 persistently failed to cohere as a genre” until 
Pocket Books gave it form in the early 1940s 
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(21). But the fluctuations in figure 2 don’t look 
like the emergence of a new genre. Instead, 
science fiction seems to be rather coherent al-
ready in the era of Verne and Wells—nearly 
as coherent as it is today, and more so than 
fantasy is today. The boundaries of the genre 
do become slightly clearer for a while in the 
second half of the twentieth century, but this 
is hardly a picture of a genre that “failed to 
cohere” until a first seed crystal took shape 
in 1926.
In fact, the blurring of boundaries in 
the last thirty- five years is at least as strik-
ing as any consolidation of science fiction 
before that point. Having raised doubts 
about Wolfe’s origin story for science fic-
tion, I should acknowledge that this recent 
trend does closely fit the thesis of his book 
Evaporating Genres. As Wolfe notes, the hy-
bridity of science fiction and fantasy—both 
with each other and with the literary main-
stream—has recently given rise to genre 
concepts like “Slipstream,” “Bizarro,” and 
“the New Weird” (164). He argues that these 
movements are symptoms of a more general 
diffusion. “Fantasy is evaporating . . . growing 
more diffuse, leaching out into the air around 
it, imparting a strange smell to the literary at-
mosphere” (viii). The downward turn for both 
genres at the end of the timeline in figure 2 
supports his story.
I have been talking about science fiction 
and fantasy as if the terms applied equally to 
works in every period, although the evidence 
already hints that this may not be true for 
fantasy. One advantage of a perspectival ap-
proach is that we don’t have to take continuity 
on faith. Observers at different points on the 
FIG. 2
The accuracy of models that identify volumes labeled “fantasy” or “science fiction” by librarians. Each point represents a single 
model trained on a random sample of texts from a certain period. Each model covers one hundred fifty texts; points are plot-
ted at the mean publication date for those texts. Trend lines are drawn through the points by (an arbitrary amount of) locally 
weighted smoothing and should be taken with a grain of salt.
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timeline could really be describing different 
things. To find out, we can model different 
perspectives and compare them.
In the case of fantasy, it may be difficult 
even to know which earlier perspectives to 
choose, because fantasy has connections to, 
among other things, children’s literature and 
Victorian medievalism. Here I have space to 
trace only one possible genealogy, running 
back to fiction that early- twentieth- century 
readers chararacterized as “supernatural” 
or “occult.” Dorothy Scarborough’s critical 
study The Supernatural in Modern En glish 
Fiction (1917) mentions several authors often 
cited today as prototypes of fantasy, such as 
Lord Dunsany and William Morris. But Scar-
borough also dwells on many books we might 
not consider genre fiction, like Eliot’s The 
Lifted Veil. Although this collection of works 
may look heterogenous to our eyes, we can 
test its underlying similarity to modern cat-
egories by running a version of the thought 
experiment that asks readers in the past and 
present to sort the same box of books. If we 
train a model on Scarborough’s supernatu-
ral fiction and ask it to identify nineteenth- 
century works labeled “fantasy” by librarians 
in the last forty years, the model trained on 
Scarborough’s collection is only 5% less ac-
curate than a model trained on recent labels. 
Clearly there is some continuity between 
Scarborough’s concept of the supernatural 
and our concept of fantasy.
The continuity doesn’t prove, however, 
that our concept of fantasy provides a good 
description of nineteenth- century fiction. On 
the contrary, there is strong evidence that Ed-
wardian categories are better at organizing 
the period. Figure 2 shows that our concept 
of fantasy doesn’t correspond to clear bound-
aries between nineteenth- century works; 
a model trained on recent labels achieves 
only 77% accuracy. A model based on Scar-
borough’s critical study does slightly better 
(81%), and best of all is a model based on cat-
egories implied by Edwardian marketing. For 
instance, we get 87% accuracy modeling the 
works of fiction gathered under the heading 
“Occultism” in Mudie’s circulating library 
catalog for 1911 (Catalogue 886; see 886–88).
This triumph for categories framed by 
immediate contemporaries is roughly what re-
cent genre theory might lead us to expect. The 
turn toward a historical conception of genre 
has led many theorists to conclude that the 
genre categories organizing a period are, by 
definition, whatever contemporary observers 
said they were (Rieder 191–92). The premise 
that genres are subject to frequent redefinition 
has also tended to shrink the range of observ-
ers who count as immediate contemporaries. 
Moretti, for instance, has conjectured that 
genres are really generational phenomena 
lasting for only “25–30 years” (21). Genres 
that seem to last longer might just be names 
that have been loosely applied to a sequence 
of distinct generation- sized phenomena. We 
already have some reason to reject Moretti’s 
conjecture, since we have seen that it is rela-
tively easy for a single textual model to rec-
ognize the generic kinship of works spread 
across two centuries. But comparing different 
perspectives on supernatural, occult, and fan-
tasy fiction still appears to confirm the em-
phasis on contemporary observers in recent 
genre theory. The most accurate models seem 
to be produced by marketing categories from 
the time the books were written.
The story becomes very different, how-
ever, when we turn to science fiction. No 
version of this genre looms at all large in 
Edwardian marketing. The catalog of Mud-
ie’s circulating library places five “pseudo- 
scientific” novels in a subcategory of a section 
on the “mysterious and marvellous,” but this 
is a tiny detail in the catalog, comparable to 
the four books grouped as “snake mysteries” 
within the much larger section on “occultism” 
(Catalogue 886). We have nevertheless seen 
that books retrospectively labeled “ science fic-
tion” by librarians do in fact compose a recog-
nizable division of nineteenth- century literary 
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 practice.  Although this category is a retro-
spective projection, it can be modeled just as 
accurately as the categories actually listed in 
contemporary catalogs and indexes. Moreover, 
we have reason to believe that the patterns 
organizing this category remained relatively 
stable from the nineteenth century to the pres-
ent, in spite of several name changes. I have 
already mentioned that a single model can 
identify with a high degree of accuracy books 
drawn from any point on the two- century 
timeline. For a more severe test of continuity, 
we can break the timeline in half and com-
pare the halves. I trained one model on books 
mentioned in Scientific Fiction in En glish, 
1817–1914, a dissertation written by James O. 
Bailey in 1934, before “science fiction” had be-
come a widely accepted term. The other model 
was trained on books from 1915 to 1975 that 
were labeled “science fiction” by librarians af-
ter 1980. When I asked each model to sort the 
other model’s list of books, I got an average ac-
curacy of 78%. This would not be impressive 
for a model trained and tested on the same 
period, like the models used to create figure 2, 
but since these models were trained on works 
selected by different observers using slightly 
different terms to characterize different centu-
ries, I would call it a significant degree of con-
tinuity. Similar tests on fantasy never achieve 
the same degree of stability, even if we allow 
contemporary librarians to select works in 
both halves of the timeline.
In short, a literary practice closely com-
parable to twentieth- and twenty- first- century 
science fiction did exist in the nineteenth 
century, although contemporary observers 
paid it scant attention and gave it a range of 
different names when they noticed it at all. 
Admittedly, this evidence of historical conti-
nuity reverses the conclusion we might expect 
a perspectival method to produce. I started 
by assuming that observers from different 
eras were describing different objects, only 
to discover that—in the case of the voyage ex-
traordinaire, scientific romance, etc.—these 
different objects were bound together more 
tenaciously than many scholars have believed. 
The experiment did begin with perspectival 
premises. But a well- designed experiment can 
challenge its own premises.
I have juxtaposed the divergent stories of 
science fiction on the one hand and supernat-
ural, occult, and fantasy fiction on the other 
in order to suggest that genre theory needs 
a more flexible framework than our present 
habits of argument can give it. Formalism 
taught us to believe that genres are durable 
implicit categories. Historicism is teaching 
us to believe that they are explicitly defined 
by contemporary observers. Neither theory 
is always reliable, because the word genre can 
cover a wide range of phenomena—patterns 
that last a decade or several centuries, overt 
marketing strategies or literary practices that 
acquire a name only in retrospect. Critics 
are not unaware of this complexity. We have 
struggled to acknowledge it in several ways—
for instance, by distinguishing genres from 
the looser patterns we call “modes.” But even 
this distinction is probably too coarse. Many 
of the transactions that puzzle literary histo-
rians take place in a no- man’ s- land between 
genre and mode. The Gothic arguably began 
as a genre and diffused outward—at some 
point—to become a mode (Richter 161–62). 
Moreover, as figure 2 shows, even practices 
understood as genres can have dramatically 
different degrees of stability.
To describe the full variety of patterns in 
literary history, we need a descriptive language 
that can acknowledge differences of degree. In 
acknowledging those gradations, numbers 
don’t confine critical description; they rather 
liberate it from a fixed taxonomy. I have shown 
that fantasy and science fiction can be modeled 
separately. But they are also sometimes com-
bined to create a larger tradition called specu-
lative fiction. Quantitative methods don’t need 
to stall out here in a semantic debate between 
lumpers and splitters. Instead we can accept 
the reality of any practice readers actually 
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recognize and simply measure the distance 
between different practices. It turns out that 
models of science fiction lose only 9 to 11% ac-
curacy when asked to recognize fantasy (and 
vice versa). So these genres are closer to each 
other than either is to detective fiction (where 
the models would lose 30% accuracy), but not 
quite as close as, say, fantasy is to Scarbor-
ough’s supernatural fiction. In the last thirty 
years fantasy and science fiction have grown 
even closer. A model of one now loses only 6% 
accuracy when asked to identify the other.6
Measuring Parallax
Our picture of genre has been sketched in 
broad strokes so far, but we can also use 
numbers to fill in color and detail. Since the 
models discussed above make predictions 
about individual works, it becomes easy to ask 
which works typify a particular perspective—
or a particular contrast between perspectives. 
For instance, if we want to understand the 
changes that separate prewar from wartime 
and postwar science fiction, we can train a 
model on examples of SF published from 1910 
to 1939. Then we can ask our prewar model to 
identify works of science fiction published in 
the next thirty years (1940–69) and compare 
its predictions to the predictions of a model 
trained directly on the later genre. This tells 
us which examples of later science fiction are 
most surprising from a prewar perspective—
hardest for a model trained on prewar works 
to recognize as science fiction. Since all these 
volumes were tagged as SF by postwar librari-
ans, we are no longer contrasting the selection 
practices of different readers. Having found a 
great deal of agreement among readers of sci-
ence fiction, we are now contrasting versions 
of science fiction defined by the practices of 
writers in different periods. Figure 3 visualizes 
the contrast. Think of each arrow as a mea-
surement of parallax, revealing how a partic-
ular book seems to shift position as we move 
from a prewar to a postwar vantage point.
Long upward- pointing arrows suggest 
that a work was very different from prewar 
SF. Many of these titles are legible as emblems 
of generic change. Judith Merril is celebrated 
as one of “one of the most visible—and volu-
ble—apostles of the New Wave in 1960s sf;” it 
makes sense that the anthologies she edited 
would dramatize new trends (Latham 251). 
Robert Heinlein’s Stranger in a Strange Land 
is also notorious for posing social questions 
that would have been alien to Amazing Stories. 
However, Jack Vance’s picaresque novella The 
Dying Earth is slightly easier to recognize as 
science fiction from a vantage point in the past.
The Dying Earth may have been old- 
fashioned; it is set in a stylized distant future 
and lacks the relative social realism of much 
postwar SF. But before speculating about the 
explanation for the downward motion of the 
tiny arrow in figure 3, we should ask how 
much evidence it actually conveys. The start-
ing and ending points of each arrow represent 
the average of thirty different modeling runs. 
Each run uses a slightly different sample of 
books to model prewar and postwar perspec-
tives on science fiction, and each run assigns 
different probabilities to individual volumes. 
The shaded circles for Player Piano represent 
a typical range of variation for one book: 
roughly 68% of probability estimates fall 
somewhere within the shaded circles. Even a 
casual visual comparison suggests that the av-
erage difference between perspectives on The 
Dying Earth will be small relative to random 
variation. A statistical test confirms that the 
difference between prewar and postwar per-
spectives on Vance’s novella could easily oc-
cur by chance. The other four measurements 
of parallax labeled in figure 3 do all represent 
statistically significant changes. But measure-
ments of parallax are rough approximations 
and cannot by themselves tell us how a par-
ticular book diverged from earlier examples 
of a genre. To interpret this evidence, we need 
to supplement it with more familiar forms of 
critical inquiry.
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In fact, figure 3 is just a slightly system-
atized version of a thought experiment that 
literary historians often attempt. If we want 
to understand why Jane Austen’s Emma was 
important, we situate ourselves imaginatively 
in a world without Henry James and Eliot—
a world where the nearest point of compari-
son is Maria Edgeworth. Perspectival models 
won’t replace that kind of imaginative im-
mersion; they aren’t nearly as sensitive as a 
human reader. They do, however, have the 
advantage of genuine ignorance. It can be 
difficult for a human being with a PhD to 
forget that the nineteenth century happened. 
But a model based on thirty years of evidence 
knows nothing beyond those thirty years. It 
doesn’t have to fake amnesia, and this makes 
it a valuable informant—as if it were a visi-
tor from 1815 or 1935 whose reaction to later 
works we could observe.
If we want to more fully understand 
a model’s reaction, we can watch it read a 
text. For instance, we don’t have to specu-
late about the aspects of Ursula Le Guin’s 
The Left Hand of Darkness that might have 
stretched prewar definitions of science fic-
tion. We can apply prewar and postwar mod-
els to individual passages from the book and 
look for places where they disagree. The pas-
sage where the models diverge most sharply 
happens to be discussing the book’s central 
premise: that people on the planet Gethen 
can play different reproductive roles at differ-
ent points in their lives. Prewar models don’t 
see this passage as typical of science fiction. 
In what follows I have italicized the words 
FIG. 3
Two different sets of models predict the probability that a volume is science fiction. The start of each arrow is the probability 
perceived by models trained on examples from 1910 to 1939; the end is the probability perceived by models trained on examples 
from 1940 to 1969. Labeled books are in black; those not labeled are left gray. The vertical radii of the shaded circles for Player 
Piano represent the standard deviation of predictions for that book; predictions for other books vary in a similar way.
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that contribute most strongly to the differ-
ence of opinion:
Consider: Anyone can turn his hand to any-
thing. This sounds very simple but its psycho-
logical effects are incalculable. The fact that 
everyone between seventeen and thirty- five or 
so is liable to be (as Nim put it) “tied down to 
childbearing” implies that no one is quite so 
thoroughly “tied down” here as women else-
where are likely to be psychologically or physi-
cally. Burden and privilege are shared out pretty 
equally; everybody has the same risk to run or 
choice to make. Therefore nobody here is quite 
so free as a free male anywhere else. (93–94)
The word male does thematize sexuality. But 
that is just one of the ways this passage sig-
nals a change in the science fiction genre. 
More broadly, its language is shaped by psy-
chological and social reasoning (burden, 
privilege, free, choice, shared, psychological ef-
fects). Heinlein’s politics were rather different 
from Le Guin’s, but a close (model- assisted) 
reading of Stranger in a Strange Land suggests 
that it baffles prewar models of science fiction 
in a similar way: by telling a story that hinges 
on psychological and social conflict rather 
than on the solution to a physics problem.
In short, quantitative evidence can be 
relevant at any scale—from a paragraph to a 
book to a century- spanning trend. But it may 
have different degrees of importance at dif-
ferent scales. At the paragraph level, quan-
titative signals are often swamped by noise. 
For example, the italicized words above are a 
small sample from a longer book, loosely il-
lustrative rather than statistically significant. 
More crucially, our familiar reading strate-
gies are just too strong at this scale to need 
a lot of help. Readers already know that Le 
Guin turned from the physical sciences to the 
social sciences. The paragraph I have quoted 
from The Left Hand of Darkness comes from a 
chapter that presents itself as the “field notes” 
of an anthropologist (89). The point of read-
ing this chapter over a model’s shoulder is not 
really to confirm our critical intuition but to 
confirm the usefulness of the model.
As we back up to a larger scale of descrip-
tion, more surprising patterns become visible. 
For instance, it hasn’t always been obvious 
that Heinlein was diverging from generic 
tradition in the same broad way as Le Guin. 
Zooming out even farther, we start to glimpse 
patterns that were invisible at the ordinary 
scale of reading. Measuring the distance be-
tween models trained on different periods, 
we discover that science fiction has often 
changed slowly (more slowly than fantasy). 
The contrast described above, across a divid-
ing line at 1940, takes place in the period of 
most rapid change. Science fiction changed 
more across this divide than it did across the 
1920s, when the term itself was invented. This 
is not a conclusion that will be immediately 
intuitive to every historian, so even distant 
readers need to build bridges between scales, 
showing how abstract measurements of his-
torical distance are related to the innovations 
visible on particular pages.
The history of genre traced above diverges 
from received opinion in at least two ways. I 
have downplayed the transformation wrought 
by Amazing Stories and emphasized the long- 
term stability of scientific romance and sci-
ence fiction compared with the things now 
called fantasy. But I have not been arguing 
that numbers give these conclusions any spe-
cial authority. Statistical models are just one 
more form of evidence, to be weighed along 
with all the others. This article recommends 
numbers to literary scholars not as a uniquely 
reliable form of evidence but as a flexible de-
scriptive language especially suited to histori-
cist questions of perspective and of degree.
In theory, to be sure, we already know 
that genres are contingent, blurry construc-
tions. But our descriptive vocabulary still 
tempts us to draw crisp boundaries. We say 
that the Gothic is a genre, or merely a mode, 
or a genre that at some point became a mode. 
We say that fantasy is distinct from science 
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fiction or isn’t, or became fully distinct only 
after The Lord of the Rings. The strategy I have 
called “perspectival modeling” can support a 
more flexible approach to description, which 
begins with the practices of historically situ-
ated readers and traces degrees of affinity 
among them. Literary constellations will take 
shape as perspectives from different periods 
recognize each other and are pulled together. 
The map that emerges from this process may 
still have some familiar landmarks—for in-
stance, a blurry region labeled “scientific ro-
mance” next to an even blurrier region with 
overlapping labels like “fantasy” and “super-
natural fiction.” But this map is a continuum: 
instead of arguing about semantic boundar-
ies, historians can use it to measure degrees 
of contestation and relative speeds of change.
Computational Hermeneutics
Critics of quantitative approaches to literature 
often argue that numbers imply an objectiv-
ity incompatible with what Johanna Drucker 
calls the “relativistic and comparative meth-
ods of the humanities” (“Humanistic The-
ory”). Drucker has advanced this case most 
systematically, arguing that the quantitative 
methods we share with other disciplines make 
evidence seem “self- evident, value neutral, 
and observer- independent” (“Humanities Ap-
proaches”). But Drucker is not alone; this cri-
tique of numbers is so common that it can be 
reduced to a dismissive gesture. For example, 
Alexander R. Galloway implies in passing that 
“bean counting” is for “young [professors] 
who don’t understand hermeneutics.”
This article has argued that quantita-
tive methods are well- suited to comparative, 
relativistic, hermeneutic questions. Numbers 
don’t inherently promise objectivity; they are 
just signs invented by human beings to reason 
about differences of degree. Since numbers 
quickly became useful in natural science, we 
have learned to associate them with physical 
measurements that don’t depend greatly on 
an observer’s position. But that is hardly the 
limit of their usefulness. Today, even natu-
ral scientists are using statistics to acknowl-
edge researchers’ subjective assumptions, or 
priors. Humanists can take the lead in using 
statistical models to represent the conflicting 
perspectives of historically situated observers.
Critics of computation are right to warn 
researchers against treating computers as ob-
jective oracles. Unsupervised algorithms in 
particular are often granted more authority 
than they deserve. The unsupervised algo-
rithms used for clustering and topic modeling 
don’t require examples labeled by human be-
ings. Just pour in texts and patterns come out. 
Occasionally, researchers imagine that the 
absence of direct human supervision gives 
these results a special authority. Alan Liu has 
called this fantasy “tabula rasa interpreta-
tion” (414). In reality, even unsupervised al-
gorithms are designed by human beings who 
make assumptions about the patterns they 
expect to find.
In the hands of writers who understand 
those assumptions, unsupervised algorithms 
have valid uses. But this essay has explored a 
different approach, which grounds interpre-
tation more explicitly in human history. Su-
pervised machine learning closely resembles 
humanists’ traditional approach to the past, 
using documents produced in another place 
and time to reconstruct a vanished perspec-
tive on the world. The chief difference be-
tween supervised models and more familiar 
methods is that a supervised model can make 
predictions about new evidence—predictions 
that allow the model to behave like a living 
observer and make revealing mistakes. By 
studying those mistakes, we can map the 
parallax between perspectives and measure 
differences of degree that would be hard to 
represent without numbers.
To address the common assumption 
that numbers inherently posit objectivity, I 
have spent much of my energy in this article 
showing that machine learning can excel at 
106 Machine Learning and Human Perspective [ P M L A
 
answering slippery perspectival questions. 
But I have also used more familiar methods, 
from close reading to reflection on Edward-
ian marketing. Since different approaches 
are suited to different questions, there is, of 
course, no right way to interpret literature. 
Sometimes we need to closely examine one 
paragraph from The Left Hand of Darkness; 
sometimes we need to compare a series of 
models stretching across two centuries. In-
stead of trying to resolve methodological 
conflict by crafting a compromise, this article 
has explored a wide range of interpretive op-
tions that it presents as compatible and con-
nected.7 “The more options the better” has 
been my implicit premise.
If quantitative methods don’t conf lict 
with humanists’ existing theories of inter-
pretation, why has controversy on the topic 
been so fierce? I believe the real problem is 
that new methods remain inaccessible. Since 
students of literature are not trained in sta-
tistics, they don’t see methods that rely on 
numbers as opportunities meant for them. 
Instead, new methods look like an opportu-
nity for others—a prospect that rarely brings 
unmixed joy to the human heart. That would 
remain true even if researchers could use a 
learning algorithm to refract the remembered 
taste of a madeleine into a synaesthetic rain-
bow that appeared different to every observer. 
A method becomes humanistic not when 
it has the right philosophical character but 
when it is in fact used by humanists.
Digital approaches to the humanities 
have been accepted most readily when they 
promise to package new methods as user- 
friendly tools. But for complex questions, a 
user- friendly interface can rarely be more 
than a gateway drug. To test their own conclu-
sions, literary scholars who use numbers will 
need knowledge of statistics and a bit of pro-
gramming experience. If we integrate those 
subjects in the literary curriculum, our dis-
cipline may soon find itself exploring change 
and continuity in new perspectival ways. If we 
don’t, no argument will be eloquent enough 
to make new methods popular. A discipline 
not trained to use statistical models will nec-
essarily see them as foreign competition. In 
that case, questions like the ones explored in 
this article will probably be asked and an-
swered by social scientists instead.
NOTES
I was able to write this article because a sabbatical from 
the University of Illinois and a Meyer H. Abrams Fellow-
ship at the National Humanities Center freed me from 
other duties.
1. For the importance of “boundaries” in this ap-
proach to culture, see Abbott.
2. I used a logarithmic scale to make this diagonal 
of disagreement more visible; if I had used an ordinary 
scale, the diagonal would have been dwarfed by agree-
ment about gender.
3. These models were created using regularized logis-
tic regression from scikit- learn (Pedregosa et al.). Fea-
tures included the most common words and punctuation 
marks, along with a few stylistic features like sentence 
length; data was drawn from Capitanu et al. The num-
ber of features in each model was selected by grid search, 
as was the regularization constant. Visualizations were 
produced using ggplot2 (Wickham). See Underwood, 
“Code” for more details.
4. The idea of comparing fantasy and science fiction 
came from Alan Liu.
5. At a later stage of inquiry it might be worthwhile 
to separate national traditions, but works by Jules Verne 
and Karel Čapek are perfectly legible as science fic-
tion, even when translated. I also regularize British and 
American spelling, in order to pose questions that span 
the Atlantic. Children’s literature has been excluded from 
this analysis, because its strong association with fantasy 
raises questions that would require a longer study.
6. For simplicity’s sake, I measure the distance between 
genres (and later on, the pace of change within a genre) by 
measuring the accuracy lost when a model trained on one 
group of works tries to recognize the boundary defining 
a different group. There are more precise ways to compare 
models. I also simplify by assuming that the distance from 
model A to model B is effectively the same as the distance 
from B to A. These simplifications don’t significantly dis-
tort the conclusions reported here, but they do play down 
the non- Euclidean geometry of culture. For an experi-
ment that measures the divergence between models more 
precisely and without Euclidean assumptions, see Under-
wood, “Historical Significance.”
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7. Literary scholars use numbers in a wider range of 
ways than a single article could explore. I haven’t said 
much about models that represent geography (Evans and 
Wilkens) or cross linguistic boundaries (Long and So). 
Nor have I fully explored the methodological debates 
that divide scholars who use numbers (Bode; Goldstone; 
Klein; Tenen). I have, admittedly, implied a general re-
sponse to those debates by suggesting that different 
approaches are usually compatible. Corpora can be com-
pared; scales of analysis can be connected.
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